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FIRST PRINCIPLES IN ETHICS.
BY WILLIAM M. SALTER.
Ir is the prerogative of man to ask for reasons for
what he is enjoined to do or believe. An animal does
not ask a reason why ; a child may not—but a devel-
oped human being has a dignity with which mere blind
obedience and unreasoning assent are felt to be in-
compatible.
It is as legitimate to question and inquire in the
ethical field as in any other. There is nothing sacred
about duty, right, good—in the sense of their making
a region which we should not explore, or look upon
with critical eyes. If we are told we ought to do any
special thing, we have a right to ask, why?
—
just as
we have a right to ask for the evidence of any theo
logical creed or any scientific or philosophical proposi-
tion. -Yes, more than "having a right," I may say
that we should ask for reasons in the realm of morals :
For, in the first place, some things which we may be
told to do may be questionable and we should not wish
to be imposed upon ; in the second place, there are
different notions of right and wrong abroad in the
world, conflicting notions, and we are obliged to have
some standard by which to judge between them
;
thirdly, the very sacredness of what is really right
should make us jealous of anything that falsely goes
by that name ; and fourthly, even what is absolutely
right should not be accepted as such by a rational
being on authority, because this or that person says
so, or this or that book so teaches—but only because
he sees it to be so with his own eyes, because it is
the deliverance, the discovery of his own reason. It
may not be possible for every one to be rationalised
at once ; and in the meantime those for whom suffice
the poets "few strong instincts " and " few are fortun-
ate ; none the less is it the ideal for every one who
has the capacities of reason in him to develop those
capacities, to "look before and after" and know the
why and wherefore of everything he does, to bring his
whole life, moral and intellectual, out into the light.
And now perhaps the first thing we need to do is
to get a clear idea of what the ethical field is, which
we are to explore. It is, firstly, the field of human
action—and not only of actions in the outward sense,
but of all that we do, whether by body or mind, so we
do it voluntarily. Whatever happens in us apart from
our will is outside the realm we are considering, just
as much as what happens without us : the digestion
of our food, for example, the circulation of the blood
—though to the extent that we can affect these by our
will they may come inside ; if, for instance, they are
feeble and imperfect and by anything we can do we
can make them stronger, healthier, it may be our duty
to do so. It is our life so far as it is regulated by our
thought that we have to do with as ethical inquirers
;
so far as it goes on of itself and is ruled by laws which
we are powerless to affect, it is beyond the province
of ethics. Yet, more particularly, all voluntary actions
may be of one sort or another, according as our thought
determines. We may, for example, in taking a walk,
go along this street or that as we choose. In talking
with a friend, we may give or we may withhold certain
information in our possession. In recollecting a prom-
ise or a vow, we may keep it or break it as one or the
other thought is predominant in us at the time. Now
wherever there are two possible thoughts and it occurs
to us to say that one is better than the other, that one
should be followed rather than the other, we enter the
field of ethics proper. This by no means always hap-
pens in the case of voluntary actions ; when we are
off for a holiday it may not matter, within limits, what
we do—whether we ride or walk or row or "lie in the
sun " and do nothing; the only duty in the matter, may
be, may be to do as we please. But sometimes we say.
This is good and that is bad ; this deserves to be done
and that ought not to be done. Such judgments are
ethical judgments ; they are not of course descriptive
of the actions, but of what the actions should be ; in
other words, they assert an ideal, and when they are
repeated and generalised, they become formulations
of a rule. Ethics is really a study of the rules of hu-
man action ; if we call it a science, it is an ideal science
—for it is not a study of the actual conduct of men
(and so differs entirely from sociology or history), but
of what that conduct would be if it conformed to cer-
tain rules ; and these rules themselves are not simply
the matter-of-fact rules which an individual or a peo-
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pie reverences, but the true rules, the rules which are
intrinsically worthy of reverence.
Here then is the field for our inquiry—not nature,
not man in general, not his actions, but the rules ac-
cording to which he conceives he should act ; and our
inquiry now is not so much, what these rules are in
detail but what is their reason for being, not so much
how and when they arose and what is their history, but
what is their justification and validity. To trace the
rule, " Thou shalt not steal," for example, back to the
one who first conceived it, to fix its authorship and
date in the dim distant past, and follow its history since,
is not the same as justifying it ; customs and rules
may have existed for ages and yet be without a rational
basis. Ethics proper, on its intellectual side, is a rea-
soning about rules of conduct, it is a testing, criticising,
accepting or rejecting the rules commonly proposed
;
and in searching for firfct principles in ethics, we are
really asking for the ultimate reasons why we should
follow (or refuse to follow) this, that or the other spe-
cial injunction, for the final justification of whatever
we call right.
Where shall we turn for light as to this problem ?
There seem to be those who think that science can
settle it for us ; they say that the basis of ethics is to
be found in a clear knowledge of the world in which
we live. And there is a measure of truth in this. If
we do not understand our own being and natural laws
about us we are to this extent in the dark, in our ac-
tions. Ignorance of the teachings of physiology and
hygiene may cause us aches and pains that knowledge
might have prevented. Ignorance of sanitary science
is doubtless responsible in part for the large mortality
of great cities. It is only by a knowledge of nature's
forces
—
gravity, heat, steam, electricity,—that we can
turn them to account and make them serve and benefit
man. If we study the facts of sociology and history,
we learn what conditions are favorable and what un-
favorable to the growth and prosperity of communities.
Such knowledge is of incalculable value ; it is a help
and guide to action—and yet there is some confusion
in regarding it as the basis of ethics or as giving us an
ultimate standard of right action. For who does riot
see that everything depends upon the use to which we
mean to put our knowledge ? It seems to be taken
for granted that everybody desires happiness or long
life for himself and for others ; that the only wish of a
person can be to use nature's forces for the general
benefit ; that all we care for is to make communities
grow and prosper— in which case it would of course
only be necessary to learn how these ends can be at-
tained. But the fact is that we may desire other
things
; we may wish to know how to cut short our
lives and how to end the lives of our people—time and
again this has happened and is happening to day, a
great part of the activity of men consisting in killing
one another or making preparations to ; we may use
nature's forces to injure as well as to benefit—a man
of violence has the same motive for getting a complete
scientific understanding of dynamite that any other
sort of man would have ; we may desire to degrade
and humiliate a people as well as uplift it and make it
prosperous—as England seems to have acted toward
Ireland. Such scientific knowledge as I have referred
to cannot be the basis or ultimate standard of ethics
(however useful and necessary it may be in a subsid-
iary way), for one may act in complete accordance
with it and yet aim at opposite things ; one may have
the clearest view of the world in which we live and yet
play either (what we are accustomed to call) a good
part or a bad part in it. The real question of ethics
is, what are the true things to aim at, what is the
meaning of playing a good or a bad part in the world
—and, so far as scientific knowledge is concerned, for
what ends shall we use that knowledge? Our veryin-
tentness on those ends (when we have discovered them)
must make us resolute on finding out every possible
means and observing every condition necessary for
attaining them.
But if science -fails us at the critical point (a cer-
tain mental confusion being involved in the very no-
tion of its being more than a subsidiary guide for us),
what else have we to do than to face the problem with
our own discursive minds and by thinking of this end
of our action and that, by weighing and balancing be-
tween them, try to find out that which seems worth-
iest, completest, most final and self-sufficient? For
this, let it now be distinctly said, is what we are in
search of— something, some state or condition which
seems good in itself, which does not need to be re-
garded as a means to another end but which of itself
satisfies the mind. If we ask for a reason for any ac-
tion or rule, it must be because the action or rule re-
quires a reason, being incomplete, objectless, irrational
without it—as when a person going down town is asked
Why? by a friend and in replying he tells his errand,
while if he should saj'. For nothing, the friend would
not know what to make of him. There are plenty of
human actions, and sustained courses of conduct that
have no meaning save in relation to some purpose be-
yond themselves. Yet on the other hand there may
be things that seem so good that we do not look be-
yond them, things that it is superfluous to ask a reason
for ; they are complete in themselves and do not re-
quire any justification. It is such things that we have
no reason of, things in virtue of which, or by their re-
lation to which, all other things are good, things that
it would be as absurd to ask for a reason for aiming
at, as for conceding the truth of any self luminous fact
of nature. If such things can be found, if a supreme
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rule (or rules) can thus be formulated and if, on the
other hand, all minor, special rules can be traced back
to the supreme one and an explanation and justifica-
tion thus be furnished for each single duty, then our
problem would be virtually solved. To give a reason
for everything that requires a reason, and to find those
things for which no reason can be given only because
they are self-evident— is all that the ethical student
can ask. It is as when (to take a minor and imperfect
illustration) having been in distant parts, we begin to
travel homewards ; at every step of the journey, at
every change from sea to land, or from train to train,
there is a reason for the action beyond itself ; but when
at last we reach the loved spot, and are safe within
the dear old walls with father and mother or with wife
and child, we do not ask a reason for being there—it
is where we belong.
Let us, then, without attempting systematic com-
pleteness, take up a few of the duties and see if good
reasons can be given for them and gradually work our
way, if it is possible, toward the discovery of ends
that are good in themselves. Temperance is one of
man's duties ; it is almost universally admitted. Yet
I think it is legitimate to ask, why we should be tem-
perate— for though familiarity with the idea may make
it appear almost self-evident, it is not from the stand-
point of. reason really so. We take in as much air as
we can with our lungs, we can hardly have too much
light and sunshine—why may we not drink as much
water or wine as we can and eat as much food? The
answer obviously is that eating or drinking beyond a
certain amount or measure is injurious to our health
;
if we have gone beyond certain limits, we strain our
bodily organism and weaken it. Hence, to the end of
health, we must be temperate ; but for this, temper-
ance would be no virtue and intemperance no vice.
Or consider the virtues of chastity and modesty ; re-
spect for them is almost instinctive in men and women
who have been normally born and educated—and yet
we may ask why these should be virtues and may
come to see that if the race were not perpetuated as
it is, if certain peculiar consequences did not flow
from certain acts, if the institution of the family
were not such an all-important factor in the evolu-
tion of man, there would be no more occasion for chas-
tity and modesty than there is for refusing to shake
hands with more than one person or for covering
one's face so it shall not be seen. A duty is no less
binding because we see the reason for it ; rather it is
only he who does see the reason who feels the full ex-
tent of the obligation, as knowing all the duty rests
upon. This, it appears to me, equally applies to truth
and falsehood. We should tell the truth to others be-
cause they need it, because without knowledge every
one is more or less in darkness ; and if there are ever
times when we should withhold the truth it is in those
rare circumstances when it may injure rather than
help. Falsehood is base because it is a sort of treach-
ery—a disowning of the bond by which we are united
to our fellow men. For the same reason we have a
right to the truth from others ; and, moreover, we
ought to give it to ourselves, or search for it, if it is
not at hand ; we can only grow, we can only step sure-
footedly in life, as we know. In brief, truth is obli-
gatory, because it is a means of benefit ; if it were in
and of itself a virtue, irrespective of the needs or cir-
cumstances of those to whom the knowledge is im-
planted, then we should have to speak the truth though
it killed people and should have to refuse to deceive
a raging animal though at the risk of being killed our-
selves.
But now let us take a step further. We have
found that there is a reason for some of the commonly-
recognised duties of life, that they are duties, because
in doing them we contribute to certain desirable ends.
In the one case, it is health ; in another, the perpetua-
tion of the race ; in another, the benefit or welfare of
men. The question then forces itself upon us, are
these ends desirable for themselves alone, or have in
turn we to give a reason for choosing them, just as we
had to for temperance, purity and speaking the truth ?
Have we at this stage arrived where we can rest, have
we the ultimate ends, the final goods, the first prin-
ciples of which we are in search? It does not alto-
gether seem so. What is for the good of our health
should indeed at once have respect from us ; and yet
I think it is tolerably evident on a little reflection that
health is desirable, because with it we can best do our
work in life, because with it we are put in possession
of all our faculties—and without it we are in a measure
useless, a burden to others and a burden to ourselves.
If we could do our work as well, if we could be as
cheerful, if we could think and attain all our higher
spiritual development as well without health as with
it, health would be a matter of indifference. And if
we ever allow an injury to our health, if we ever take
risks with it (with the sanction of conscience, I mean),
it is in aiming at some good beyond it— as mothers
may in child-bearing, as explorers and pioneers may
in opening up new countries to the world, as students
and philosophic thinkers may in endeavoring to un-
ravel the mysteries of existence, as reformers may in
contending with old wrongs and abuses, as patriots
ma)' who risk their very life in the defense of their
firesides and homes. We should keep our health for
a purpose ; it is not an end in itself. I am obliged to
think in the same way of the perpetuation of the race.
I think we may ask, why should we follow these deep-
seated instincts of our nature? Natural as it may be
to obey them, self-evident as it may seem to many
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that there ought to be more and more people in the
world, I think that on sober reflection we are bound to
ask, why? My answer would be that whether more
people in the world are desirable depends upon what
sort of people they are to be, how circumstanced
(whether favorably or no to a really human develop-
ment)—for we can easily conceive of conditions (and
there are likely to be such in the later history of the
globe) in which life would be a pitiful, useless strug-
gle ; and there may be inborn tendencies, physical and
mental, that may make it better for some men and
women not to have children now. The perpetuation
of the race is a good, so far as it means the possibil-
ity of the race rising ever to higher and higher levels,
so far as it means that there may be new human be-
ings who may do better than their fathers and moth-
ers did (or, at least as well), so far as it means the
continuity and perpetuation and advancement of that
spiritual something we call human civilisation and
culture. No, the family, is not an end ; it is a means
to an end—a necessary means, indeed, and thereby a
sacred institution, but still looking beyond itself; and
these fathers and mothers are truly hallowed in their
domestic lives who wish to bring up their children to
carry still further the conquests of light, of love, and
of justice in the world.
Yet when we think of the third end of which dis-
covery was made—namely, the benefit or welfare of
men, must we not say that this is a self-evident good,
that no reason outside it is required for seeking it,
since it appeals so immediately to us? In a sense it
must be admitted that this is so. The reasons that
have been given for the other ends, just discussed,
are more or less closely connected with this end. And
yet it is necessary that we have a clear idea of what
the benefit or welfare of men means. There may be
different standards by which to judge it, there may be
limited notions of it; and we must not content our-
selves with a phrase or a vague idea. Some may un-
derstand by welfare simply being well-situated in life,
secure against enemies and accidents ; but such wel-
fare is as one-sided and incomplete a notion as health
—we may ask, Why should we be thus favorably situ-
ated ? what is the good of it, if we do not make more
of ourselves thereby ? Others may understand by wel-
fare happiness ; and surely happiness has the marks
of being a good in itself. When we are happy, we
do not ask why, to what end are we happy? For all
labor, for all effort, for all self-denial there must be a
reason ; but there needs be no reason for happiness.
And yet happiness, while a good (in itself), is not nec-
essarily the good, the whole good; and such is its sin-
gular nature that it may be connected with not only
what is otherwise good, but with what is unworthy
and bad. Are there not those who find happiness in
ruling other people and bringing them under their
thumb, are there not those who find happiness in liv-
ing in the eyes of the world and being continually no-
ticed and applauded, are there not those who find
happiness in giving themselves up to selfish pursuits
and are never so pleased as when they have driven a
successful bargain at somebody else's loss? Happi-
ness in and of itself is innocent and is one of the first
ends of our being, but when it is made into the only
end, when other goods are made secondary or ignored,
it may be the accompaniment of ignoble as well as no-
ble action; moreover, in the existing state of human
nature, happiness is so variable a quantity, that it can
scarcely be said to furnish a standard at all (even a
low or poor one), and so an ancient writer said well,
" Pleasure is the companion, not the guide of virtue."
We may live for happiness, if we only make it con-
sistent with other ends of our being ; we may work for
other's happiness, so it be a worthy happiness, a hap-
piness which is a harmonious part of a total good.
Physical security and comfort, happiness—these
are not enough as measures of man's welfare; the one
is too low, the other too variable. And how is it pos-
sible to judge of welfare save by saying that it must
take in the whole of man, not only the life of the body
or the satisfaction of existing desires, but the life of
the mind and spirit, the possibilities of willing and
achieving, the capacities of love—so that to work for
human welfare means to work for the cultivation, the
enrichment, the indefinite enlargement and expansion
of the entire life of men, physical and spiritual? If
we mean by human welfare, human perfection, if we
set before ourselves the ideal of a perfected humanity
—then we have an end in which we can rest, a goal
that has every appearance of being a final goal, be-
cause we can imagine nothing greater beyond it, be-
cause there is no outside purpose a perfected human-
ity could serve which could be as great as itself. We
may not be able to say beforehand all that a perfected
humanity would attain, all it would be ; we may not
be able to present a definite picture of it
—
yet we know
the tendencies, the capacities that await a full and
complete development, we know the lines of advance
in the past, we see how they stretch out before us
now ; we know our direction, our bearing—and what
will be (or should be) in the future is only an exten-
sion, an unfolding, a blossoming and ripening of what
we have now. Humanity's powers, (all it has con-
sciously, all that may be revealed to it) passed into
realisation—the mind, the heart, the will of universal
man in full play and triumphant activity ; that is the
ideal that seems to sum up what is valid in all other
ideals, that is the good which serves to measure all
other goods ; everything is right which tends to its
accomplishment and everything is wrong which tends
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to defeat it and make it impossible ; all our duties
(which are real duties) have their ultimate sanction
here—they are explained by, derived from the one su-
preme duty of laboring for such a consummation;
every valid rule of action is only an application of the
sovereign rule to work for the perfection of society,
for the total development of the capacities of man.
It is only another way of stating this to say that we
have now reached the point where we cease to ask for
reasons. It is as with any scientific investigation ;
when we reach an ultimate law of nature or an ulti-
mate fact, we are satisfied. We do not wish to go be-
yond it, because there is no going beyond it; and all
the demands and efforts of our reason might be said
to be to the end of finding something about which we
have to reason no more. Such a recognition as this
when made in the realm of morals is sometimes mis-
understood. When we propose an ultimate rule of
right action and say that no reason can be given for it,
this is misinterpreted as meaning that we give up re-
liance or reason and abandon ourselves to mysticism ;
while it is reason and reason only that has brought us
to the discovery of the ultimate rule, and the rule
might be called (if so long a word can be pardoned)
the objectification of reason—that is, reason written
out into an objective law. Mysticism is, if I under-
stand the word, a love of vague, shadowy, nebulous
thoughts, a preference of twilight or the dark rather
than the clear light of day ; but nothing is clearer, more
distinct, (to one who thinks along the lines I have just
followed) than this ultimate law of right which I have
stated ; no reason could be given for it that is as clear
as the law itself. A sense of all this is the motive for
the assertion sometimes made that it is absurd for a
man to ask. Why should I do right ? For when one finds
the real, ultimate right, the question is absurd ; but
this does not mean that it is absurd to ask why one
should be temperate, or truthful, or chaste, or obedient
to authority, all of which are right only in relation to cir-
cumstances that may change. When we find out what
is right, when we discover any special minor duty that
is really duty, there is nothing under heaven for us
but to do it; and the question. Why? as it is some-
times raised does not mean a demand for intellectual
clarification, but rather. What am I going to get by
doing right ? and springs from a base motive rather
than a noble one. There are not a few of these spe-
cious questioners to-day—weak, timid children of fash-
ion and conventional religion—who ask why should
they rule their passions and live sober righteous lives,
unless it is that they are going to be rewarded for it
hereafter; so little does popular Christianity really
educate the moral nature of its followers. For there
is this implication in the idea of an ultimate rule of
action—namely, that man has a capacity of acting in
accordance with it, that there' is (what we may call for
lack of a better term) an instinct for the right in him,
a love for the right as such, just as there is a love for
the truth as such, irrespective of any personal gain
save the consciousness of knowing it; this disinter-
ested love of truth is the basic motive of science and
the love of right is the basic motive of really moral
conduct.
From the standpoint of the supreme rule it ought
now to be possible to survey the whole field of duty
and to give an explanation and justification for each
minor rule. This would be necessary to complete our
investigation and to give it a thoroughly scientific
character. But I fear I have already taken more space
than should be accorded to a single article.
THE "IS" AND THE "OUGHT."
The distinction between explicative and normative
sciences is for certain purposes very commendable.
Such sciences as psychology, physiology, botany, gram-
mar, etc., explain the "is," they describe facts as they
are, while such sciences as logic, horticulture, hygiene,
ethics, etc., set forth an "ought"; they prescribe the
methods by which a certain ideal is to be attained.
Normative sciences in so far as they are practically
applied are also called disciplines.
Yet the distinction between explicative and norma-
tive sciences is artificial ; it serves a certain purely
scientific purpose, viz. to discriminate between natural
laws and rules ; but it is not founded in the nature of
things. The realities which form the objects of these
sciences are undivided and indivisible. Hygiene is
possible only on the basis of physiology ; logic only
on the basis of a knowledge of the actual modes of
thought ; horticulture only on the basis of botany, and
ethics only on the basis of psychology and sociology.
It is true that as a rule a skilled gardener will raise
better fruit than a scientific botanist, but the best fruit
will be raised in the botanical gardens where skill is
guided by scientific insight.
The ethics of mankind has up to date been almost
exclusively in the hands of the clergy, who in so far as
they are imbued with the spirit of dogmatism, claim to
be in possession of a nostrum which was by a divine
revelation entrusted solely to their care, and maintain
that nothing can be learned from science. The pres-
ent age, however, no longer believes in nostrums and
science penetrates everywhere. Humanity has found
out that ethics forms no exception among the norma-
tive disciplines and that it can be based upon science
as much as hygiene and horticulture.
The greatest demand of the time is not as the icon-
oclast says the abolition of religion, it is not as the
dogmatist says, a revival of the blind faith of ages gone
by, the greatest demand of the time is a conciliation
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between religion and science, is the imbuement of the
clergy with the holy spirit of research, not in their
symbolic books only, not in the Bible only, but in the
wider and more reliable revelation of God, in nature
;
the greatest demand of the time is the maturing of
dogmatic religion into a religion of science which will
finally turn the cathedrals, temples, and synagogues
of mankind into churches of science.
The Christian catechisms distinguish between the
visible churches and the Invisible Church, the latter
being the ideal of the former. There is a great truth
in this distinction. The Invisible Church is that church
whose faith is the religion of science, who preaches
the ethics based upon facts and stands upon the ground
of demonstrable truth. The Invisible Church is an
ideal ; but it is not an air castle. The Invisible Church
is the aim toward which the development of all the
visible churches tends. So long as the visible churches
grow to be more and more like the Invisible Church,
they will be and remain the moral leaders of mankind.
If the churches refuse to progress with the spirit
of the time, they will lose their influence upon society,
and the kingdom will be taken from them and given
to others. That which we want, that which we must
have, and that which mankind will have after all, if
not to-day or to-morrow, yet in some not too distant
future is a church which preaches the religion of hu-
manity, which has no creed, no dogmas, but avowing
a faith in truth and in the provableness of truth,
teaches an ethics based upon the facts of nature.
When the Ethical Societies were founded many
people hoped that a movement was started which
would supply the demand of a religion of science and
of scientific ethics applied to practical life. This hope
was not fulfilled. The founder of the ethical societies is
swayed by principles which are little short of an actual
hostility toward science, and Mr. Salter is not as yet
free from the belief that the ultimate basis of science
rests upon some transcendental principle. Science in
his opinion fails at the critical point.
The Societies of Ethical Culture can be called pro-
gressive in so far only as they discard rituals and cere-
monies ; but they are actually a reactionary movement
on the main point in question. And there are frequent
instances of clergymen and rabbis who proclaim freely
and boldly the advanced ideas of a scientific concep-
tion of religion. Such views are not only not heard
from the platforms of the Societies for Ethical Cul-
ture, but they are stigmatised by their leader.
It seems to me that in the present article Mr. Sal-
ter has considerably approached our position. He
objects to mysticism, which Professor Adler formerly
regarded as an indispensable element of ethics and
ethical culture, and we may hope that the barrier of
his transcendentalism that separates us still may be
broken down too.
Mr. Salter says ;
" Here then is the field for our inquiry—not nature, not man
in general, not his actions, but the rules according to which he
conceives he should act."
But he exclaims with a tinge of hopeless despair,
as if there were no answer to the question :
" Where shall we turn for light as to this problem ? "
He answers the question by a counter-question ; he
asks :
" Who does not see that everything depends upon the use to
which we mean to put onr knowledge ?
"
"It seems to be taken for granted that everybody desires hap-
piness or long life for himself and others."
"But the fact is that is<e may desire* other things."
Is Mr. Salter's question unanswerable ? We hope
not; for if it were unanswerable, ethics could not ex-
ist as a science.
The ultimate question of ethics is not what WE
desire, but on the contrary what IS desired of us. We,
i. e. our personal likes and dislikes, our intentions to
make or to mar, have nothing to do with the subject.
Ethics does not in the least depend upon the use to
which we mean to put our knowledge. The mere in-
troduction of the we and what roe intend to use facts
for, will produce confusion. This "we" of our per-
sonal desires is the veil of Maya which deceives us
and leads us so easily astray.
The "is" that forms the basis of the "ought" in
ethics consists in the nature of mankind and of the
universe in which mankind exists. The laws of na-
ture, especially of human nature and of the evolution
of humanity, are the very same thing which the dog-
matic religions call "the will of God." The will of
God remains and will remain, for ever and aye, the ba-
sis of ethics.
Facts are such as they are, and the laws of nature
will prevail. This is the basic truth of ethics and any
question whether we shall recognise the will of God,
whether we shall acknowledge the truth of nature's
laws, whether we shall adopt the rules that are de-
rived from the "is" into our will as the supreme rule
of action, is another question of a personal nature, but
it does neither invalidate the basis of ethics, nor does
it stand in any connection with it.
We might be dissatisfied with the laws of nature
and might imagine that we, if we had created the
world, should have arranged them better than they are.
We might decline to respect the precepts of the moral
ought. That would doom our souls to perdition, for
O Man ! who art thou that repliest against God ?
(Rom. ix, 20.) It is hard for thee to kick against the
pricks. (Acts ix, 5.)
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The ought of ethics remains the same whether I, or
you, or anybody else, deigns to follow, or refuses to fol-
low, its behests ; for the ultimate basis of ethics is not
founded upon any so-called immovable rock of our con-
science, not upon our subjective likes or dislikes, not
upon what we choose to do or to leave alone. The
ultimate basis of ethics is of an objective nature. The
criterion of ethics is one of fact and not of opinion.
That which has to be the standard of moral action can
be inquired into, and can be searched for by scientific
methods ; it can be stated with as much exactness as
the mathematical or logical rules or as any other pre-
cepts of the normative sciences.
Ethics is a normative science. It is as truly a science
in every respect as are all the normative sciences.
The ultimate principles of the normative sciences are
not of a transcendental nature, they are founded upon
the actual facts of life ; the "ought" derives its rules
from the "is," the ideal is rooted and must be rooted
in the real. p. c.
CURRENT TOPICS.
It is not the habit of Chicago citizens to go into hysterics be-
cause rain falls in March, and yet they pretend to be worried and
flurried because bribes have been accepted by members of the City
Council, where bribery is as natural and easy as rain upon the
lake. Public virtue comes in spasms, and seven aldermen were
indicted yesterday, literally in a spasm ; the indictments against
them being of that sudden, dangerous, and unconstitutional kind
known at the Court House as "dummy "
;
good enough says the
apology for them, to hold the accused persons "until the State's
Attorney can file indictments more specific." Better to endure
bribery than "dummy" indictments, for bribery at the worst is
only a species of larceny affecting the public pocket, while "dum-
my " indictments threaten the liberty and the good name of every
citizen in the land. In the present case the ethical distinction be-
tween the bribery charged and the "dummy" indictment which
charges it is this, that the bribery was wilfully felonious, while
the State's attorney in drawing the "dummy" indictment was in-
nocent of any intention to do wrong ; indeed he was only too hasty
to do right ; but a judge should never hold a man to bail on such
an indictment. It is too severe a strain upon the constitution and
the law. A " dummy " indictment with the names of "dummy"
witnesses upon the back of it is fraught with potentiality of mis-
chief. The "dummy " indictment on which the accused aldermen
have been held to bail, makes no fact averments of any kind. It
contains nothing but a conclusion of law prefaced by an abstract
accusation. The excuse that it was necessary to hurry lest the
men should get away is not good, because they could have been
arrested on a warrant issued by any Justice of the Peace, on a
sworn information.
* ' *
The paroxysm of indignation at the swaggering rapparees
in the City Council who for years have been plundering the citizens,
and selling valuable bits of the city itself, while entirely natural
and just, contains within it a good deal of affectation ; and in its
present form of action, it makes another fierce attack upon the
shadows, leaving the substance undisturbed. We imprison a knave
or two, but cultivate the conditions out of which they grow. We
provide all the facilities for public larceny, and then affect to be
shocked by official theft. We submit to Saloon government ad-
ministered by an aristocracy of the slums, and then wonder why
corruption develops in the City Legislature. We put the control
and disposal of millions into the hands of the beery elements,
and then ask them to guard and protect the city honestly for
nothing. We pay only nominal salaries to aldermen e.xpecting them
to reward themselves by collateral gains, which they very liberally
do. Judging from the clouds of tobacco smoke which perfume the
Council Chamber when the Honorable Council is in session, the
salary of an alderman can barely pay for his cigars. Every Dem-
ocratic committee, and every Republican committee that makes
an assessment on candidates for seats in the Council, must at least
suspect that in many cases they are asking for a share of antici-
pated spoil. The theory of our municipal constitution is that alder-
men shall give to the public something for nothing, and the prac-
tice of the aldermen is to reject that rule and give something for
something to private corporations. The only wonder is that under
a system of multiple temptations, there are now, and always have
been men in the city Council, faithful, vigilant, and absolutely in-
corruptible. This is the hope that lies at the bottom of this Pan-
dora's box. " Tim wants to run for alderman again this year, and
it's a shame for Tom to be trying to get the nomination away from
him," said a partisan advocating his friend. "Tim ought to have
another term, because this year there'll be something to be made."
The aldermanic Tims and Toms, who aspire to the City Council
because "this year there'll be something to be made," are the
microbes born of a diseabe, and propagating a disease which "dum-
my" indictments will not cure.
Like the clatter of tin pans comes up a lot of delirious clamor
for the indictment cf the bribers too ; and there are thoughtless
critics who demand a double punishment for them. This is an
erroneous view of justice, because in municipal bribery there is
usually no equipoise of guilt between the bribers and the bribed.
John Adams, in his old age, desired that it might be said of him
hereafter, " Here is one who never seduced any woman, nor any
man" ; and the glory of that praise will shine for ever about him
like the aureola that the painters draw. Even a long career of pa-
triotic statesmanship grows pale within its light ; but in the ordin-
ary corruptions of a civic parliament the seduction of an honest
man is rare. There is an important moral difference between the
giving of a bribe, and the payment of a toll. Illegal money ex-
torted by an alderman for the performance of a duty is a bribe
in the hands of the man who takes it, but from the hands of a man
who pays the money it may be only the tribute of blackmail.
When legitimate business is blockaded by aldermanic tariffs, what
can enterprise do but raise the blockade by payment of the toll.
A man in the hands of brigands pays a ransom for his libeity, but
he does not thereby become a brigand. There are citizens in Chi-
cago of the highest character who have been compelled to remove
municipal obstructions out of the way of their lawful business by
paying money to men who live by City Hall brokerage, the buying
and selling of aldermen. It is an inflamed and irrational anger
that includes broker, aldermen, and victims in one moral indict-
ment ; and by putting them all into one criminal indictment the
law bafles its own ministers and defeats itself, because by making
the victims criminal their testimony is lost, and the bribe taker is
made secure. An instructive example of this folly is that part of
the Inter-State Commerce Law, where it is made criminal for a
railroad company to grant rebates, and equally criminal to accept
them. This latter provision defeats the former, because the ship-
per is protected by it from giving evidence. So, the law should
make a distinction between the man who deliberately corrupts an
alderman for purposes of public plunder, and the citizen who
merely pays illegal tribute for permission to engage in a legal and
beneficial business. If bribers were exempt from penalties and
could be compelled to testify, the business of bribe taking would
soon be at an end.
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Here is a bit of expressive news which I copy from a morning
paper, "A committee of prominent members of the Jacksonian
club of Omaha, arrived yesterday at the Sherman House to ar-
range for 1000 enthusiastic democrats who will attend the Na-
tional Convention. 'Nebraska will send an uninstructed delega-
tion,' said Mr. Sternsdorf, 'Our club and the democracy of the
whole state are divided on the Presidential question ; we shall
however, stand by the nominee, whoever he may be.'" This
piece of information and its animating sentiment exhibit a very
fair sample of that self-abasement which goes by the name of
party loyalty. Those "enthusiastic democrats" are not coming
to the convention as delegates, but merely to make an enthusiastic
noise. They are not players in the Presidential game ; they are only
chips with which political shufflers gamble for the government.
They are the morally inanimate counters with which the "states-
men" play. As to the meaning of " democrat, " no two of them
understand it alike, but they do know that the whole thousand of
them are democrats, ready to "stand by the nominee, whoever he
may be," even Mephistopheles himself. In their partisan blind-
ness they swear by Saint Jefferson, who had such intellectual'
scorn for them. Although they were not born in 1789, he knew
they would be born, and he told them then that he never submitted
his opinions to the creed of any body of men, in religion, in philos-
ophy, in politics, or in anything else where he was capable of
thinking for himself ; and he said, "Such an addiction is the last
degradation of a free moral agent. If I could not go to heaven
but with a party, I would not go to heaven at all." This doctrine
is repudiated by his disciples, the "enthusiastic democrats" from
Omaha. If they cannot go to heaven in a party procession they
will prefer to stay out of it altogether, although there is not the
slightest chance that a democratic procession would be allowed in-
side the celestial gates. Jefferson was the founder of the mugwumps ;
he would be free, or nothing. About the time the democrats meet in
convention at Chicago, the republicans will meet in convention at
Minneapolis, and Omaha will very likely send a thousand enthu-
siastic republicans there, to howl for the winner, and yowl at the
loser, and "stand by the nominee."
*
Although the democrats of Nebraska are prepared to "stand
by the nominee," they are "divided on the Presidential question,"
and this marks an advance in the evolution of party morals, be-
cause it shows that even political chips may have independent
spirit enough to thinE for themselves before the convention, if not
after it ; whereas, in former days, as I well remember, a true par-
tisan had no soul of his own at either time. Early in i860, and
long before the conventions of that year were held, I heard a man
say to a friend, "Who is your first choice for the nomination ?"
The answer was, " My first choice is the nominee." The enthu-
siastic partisan had abdicated himself so effectually, and surren-
dered himself so unconditionally to the caucus, that he had not
manhood enough to form a choice or to express any opinion in
advance of its decree. Lately I have read in a democratic paper
of national importance that Senator Hill is quite unfit for the
Presidency, by reason of much intrinsic and extrinsic moral weak-
ness, and the editor finishes a high spirited and indignant protest
against Mr. Hill's presumption, with this obsequious promise to
obey the caucus, "Still, should Mr. Hill be nominated, he will re-
ceive our hearty and enthusiastic support." All of which reminds
me of Bill McBride, editor of The lifarliletown Independent, a re-
publican organ in the days before the war. Quincy A. Bellows,
editor of T/ie Free /-'lag, a rival republican journal, wanted to be
a member of the legislature, and was laying pipe for the nomina-
tion, when his pretensions were thus "laid bare" by McBride.
'
' We understand that the recent importation who edits the Feeble
Flieker in the alley, aspires to be a member of the General Assem-
bly. This impudent ambition reveals a conscience made of leather.
It is well known to the people of Marble county that he is in the
daily practice of the seven deadly sins, and Quince has no more
chance for the legislature than he has for heaven. Still, should
he be nominated by the republican convention, he will receive our
hearty and enthusiastic support." Mr. Bellows did get the nomi-
nation, whereupon the Independent said, "The work of the con-
vention was well done, and the people of Marble county will be
represented in the next legislature by that vigorous writer, that
eloquent orator, and staunch republican the Hon. Quincy Adams
Bellows." M. M. Trumbull.
NOTES.
Tlie Conso-vator comments upon our last criticism of The So-
cieties for Ethical Culture as follows ; " Mr. Cams thinks that we
" need to square ethical statement with fact. So do I. So does
"Mr. Salter."
. . .
.
" It is astonishing that Mr. Carus resists all
"explanation."
We call The Consei-vator' s attention to Mr. Salter's article in
the present number, which may be compared with the following
passage quoted from Mr. Salter's book " Ethical Religion," p. 37 :
"Base morality on facts ? Which facts ? There are innumerable
"facts, an induction from which would only give us immorality.
"The good facts, then ? But plainly, this is moving in a circle.
" In truth, there is nothing on ivhich to base morality. We do not
" so much find it, as demand it in the world."
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